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THE CHOSEN PEOPLE IN OUR
WILDERNESS
Susan P. Koniak*
STORM: AMERICA'S MILITIA THREAT. By Morris
Dees with James Corcoran. New York: HarperCollins. 1996. Pp.
233. $24.
GATHERING

RURAL RADICALS:

RIGHTEOUS RAGE IN THE AMERIcAN GRAiN.

By Catherine McNicol Stock. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

1996. Pp. xi, 197. $25.
When custom presses on the souls apart,
Who seek a God not worshiped by the herd,
Forth, to the wilderness, the chosen start
Content with ruin, having but the Word.1
INTRODUCrION

Strangers there are among us, practicing with weapons for
something they believe might come - something some of them believe should come. Militia men, patriots, self-proclaimed true
Americans. Chosen people. What are we, members of the power
elite, the academy, the legal intelligentsia - the other chosen people - to make of them? Sideshow freaks may titillate even a
scholar, but they rarely, if ever, inform. Is there more here?
Along with the authors of GatheringStorm and Rural Radicals,
I believe there is. Neither of these books sets out to convince lawyers or law professors in particular that these groups are worthy of
attention, but both are written to convince a more general audience
that these groups warrant serious attention. Gathering Storm is
written for the public at large, while Rural Radicals is written for a
more highly educated subset thereof. Unfortunately, neither book
is entirely successful at its assumed task, although both pose important questions.
Gathering Storm is an informer's report, an expos6 of a movement whose numbers and potential to do violence most of America
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. B.A. 1975, New York University,
J.D. 1978, Yale. [Author. please verify degrees, dates, and institutions]. - Ed. This book
review draws heavily on ideas I articulated first in When Law Risks Madness, 8 CARDozo
STU. L & LrrEATuRE 65 (1996).
1. John Masefield, Lines on the Tercentenary of Harvard College (1936), quoted in JoHm
BARTLt, FAMmAR QUOTATIONS 947 (14th ed. 1968).
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underestimates, according to the authors. The credentials of the
authors suggest that they know of what they speak. Morris Dees2 is
one of the founders of the Southern Poverty Law Center, an organization that Dees has valiantly led into battle against the Klan and
other bigoted domestic groups. His co-author, Professor James
Corcoran, 3 authored Bitter Harvest,4 an insightful and well-written
account of Gordon Kahl's odyssey from farmer to protester to killer
to martyr, and the hardship and discontent that created so many
Kahl sympathizers in America's heartland.5 As an admirer of the
work of both these men, I was disappointed to find their book
poorly constructed and indulgent in style.
The chapters of Gathering Storm seem almost randomly
ordered. I felt unsure, as I made my way through this book, that
these authors had laid out a path designed to get their readers to
any particular place. Instead, Dees's desire to illustrate his courage,
foresight, and importance seems to dictate the route. Dees has reason for conceit: I believe he qualifies as a genuine lawyer-hero who
has risked much to bring more justice into this imperfect world.
Unfortunately, the chest-thumping in this book highlights his frailties and leaves his strengths in shadow - surely not the goal he had
in mind. For Corcoran, who can write well,6 this book is similarly
no tribute. Its writing is pedestrian at best. Perhaps Corcoran
found playing second fiddle to Dees unsatisfying and lost interest or
control over the final product. Nonetheless, with all of its flaws, the
book contains some interesting information about these strange militia groups, and it manages to suggest why these groups should be
of particular interest to scholars of the law.
Dees believes that law is the best answer to the militia threat.
Dees's belief in law can hardly be considered naive; he has used law
to combat evil before. Dees has put the Klan into bankruptcy
(Dees & Corcoran, pp. 100-01), enjoined those hell-bent on terrorizing their Vietnamese neighbors (Dees & Corcoran, pp. 36-39);
and crippled with economic damages other purveyors of hate, like
Tom Metzger and his neo-Nazi White Aryan Resistance group
(Dees & Corcoran, p. 101). Indeed, the book ends with a legal prescription to combat the menace Dees and Corcoran describe: the
active enforcement of existing state laws that prohibit private armies and the enactment of such laws where they do not now exist
(Dees & Corcoran, pp. 220-21). Dees's faith in law, and his use of
2. Chief Trial Counsel, Southern Poverty Law Center & Militia Task Force.
3. Associate Professor and Chairman, Communications Department, Simmons College.
4. See JAMES

CORCORAN, BrER

HARvST:

CoMrrATUS (1990).
5. See infra notes 13845 and accompanying text.
6. See generally CORCORAN, supra note 4.

GORDON KAHL AND Tmr POSSE
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it, challenges most modem jurisprudential thought, which portrays
law as a weak force, a handmaiden to economics, politics, literature,
or any other number of disciplines. If he is right, perhaps we are
missing something about law's nature and its potential to reshape
the world? If he's wrong, can we prove it? And then what?
Rural Radicals raises a very different set of issues. Professor
Stock, 7 a historian at Connecticut College, seeks not so much to
warn us of the danger posed by these strangers in our midst, but to
locate them in a historical continuum of American activists and
thereby convince us that there is promise as well as danger in the
spirit that animates these folks. Professor Stock's project is to sort
out the common threads in social movements separated by vast expanses of time, all of which she argues are properly identified as
originating in rural, as opposed to urban, America.
Stock's whirlwind trip from Shay's Rebellion in the late 1700s to
the Grange movement in the late 1800s to the patriot movement of
our times, with various other stops, is intriguing, although in the
end somewhat unsatisfying. Stock attempts to explain too much
with the aid of a few, somewhat fuzzily defined concepts. For instance, she defines "rural" so broadly that this Brooklynite began to
think Coney Island and its culture could qualify.8 However ultimately unpersuasive her account is, this well-written, short book is
worth the time it takes to read it. Why? Because it seems to me
that Stock is onto something.

7. Professor of History, Connecticut College.
8. See Stock, p. 7. Stock provides no concise definition of "rural," but she claims that
"[o]ly in the countryside" do five aspects of life combine to form a particular belief-set that
she labels "rural." Stock, p. 7. These five aspects of life are: frontier life, class, race, gender,
and evangelism. Stock, p. 7. I grew up in Sheepshead Bay, Brooklyn, which is not far from
Coney Island - the place I reference in the text because I think more readers will have
heard of it. Sheepshead Bay, like Coney Island, is at the extreme end of Brooklyn farthest
from Manhattan, which I grew up calling "the city" to distinguish that far-off place from
Sheepshead Bay. No one in Sheepshead Bay would have said they lived in "the city" because
that meant Manhattan to all of us. Sheepshead Bay had no building greater than eight stories
and supported a small fishing fleet manned by neighborhood folks. Is life in such a place less
frontierslike than life in Boise, Idaho, where the townsfolk undoubtedly see themselves as
city-dwellers compared to those who live in less inhabited parts of modem Idaho? I am, in
short, unsure how to apply Stock's first criterion, frontier life, to the experience of those
living in the continental United States of the 1990s. But it seems possible that Sheepshead
Bay or Coney Island could make as good a claim as many of the places Stock means to
include. As for the other aspects of life that Stock says only combine in rural places,
Sheepshead Bay could compete easily on three of the four other scales: class identification,
deep racial identification and divisions, and a commitment to patriarchy thriving despite a
strong tradition of women functioning as important economic contributors to family life. As
for her last criterion, evangelic religion, among Sheepshead Bay's White population,
Protestantism was all but unknown. Whites in the Sheepshead Bay of my youth were either
Catholic, Jewish, or Greek Orthodox. But religious feeling ran high, particularly in the
Catholic community, where Christ and the saints were not abstract concepts, but palpable
features of everyday life.
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Stock succeeded in convincing me that the patriots of today are
connected in some way to the whiskey rebels of our constitutional
infancy and to many of the other groups she discusses. What she
seems to lack are the analytic or other tools necessary to make
sense of the similarities evident in the narratives she provides. Her
failure to explain with any precision the connections among these
various movements, or their import, makes it particularly important
that other scholars who might be better suited to this task read her
book and pick up where she leaves off. Understanding the connections Stock struggles to explain might teach us much about where
we have been as a nation, where we are now, and where we might
be going. That is not, however, the only reason that legal scholars
should be interested in this book.
They "took the law into their own hands." Time and again,
Stock resorts to this language or its equivalent to describe the
actions of radicals in various historical periods (Stock, pp. 29, 89, 91,
96). Stock, not a lawyer or a law professor, obviously believes those
words mean something, and she seems confident that what she
means by them will be understood by her readers. As legalscholars, however, these words are not so easy for us to understand.
Can violence wielded by private parties ever be called law? What
accounts for Stock's need to reach for this phrase repeatedly in
describing the violence wielded by the groups she discusses? The
fact that we would not expect to see that phrase in a book about the
violence of drug-users suggests that some violence seems more like
law than other violence. How does some violence masquerade as,
or take on the quality of, law? In a society like ours, knee-deep in
both lawful and unlawful violence, should not our jurisprudence
concern itself with such a question?
Both of these books thus raise important questions for legal
scholars, although neither sets out to do so. But they both ignore
completely something about the groups they study, which not only
would have enriched the analysis in each book and been of interest
to the general public, but would also have made the importance of
these groups to legal scholars much clearer: The militia movement
has created law.
It is the law that these groups have created that makes these
groups of immediate importance to legal scholars. My interest in
the militia movement's law and what it means for the law that we
teach and the jurisprudence that we articulate is what brought me
to these books. I was thus sorely disappointed to find that neither
book discusses this aspect of the culture created by the militia, or
Christian Patriot, movement. Perhaps the authors could not see the
law before them because the dominant jurisprudential paradigm in
our culture so thoroughly equates law with the state that law with-
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out a state is difficult to imagine.9 In the remainder of this review, I
insist that we stretch our imagination to enable us to see.
THE COMMON LAW WORLD

I have read a fiery gospel, writ in burnished rows of steel:
"As ye deal with my contemnors, so with you my grace shall deal;
Let the hero born of woman, crush the serpent with his heel,
Since God is marching on."' 0
Origins

Out of a fiery gospel and a truncated version of the Constitution
of the United States, a movement of people has created its own law.
They call it "Common Law" and their courts "Common Law

Courts"'" or "Our One Supreme Court."'12
Law is more than a system of rules to be observed or a set of
formal institutions that demands recognition; it is a world in which
people live. 13 From the legal world in which we live, the Common
Law world seems incoherent. The Common Law calls its people

9. That is not to say that all legal scholars suffer from such a failure of imagination; they
do not. Among modem legal scholars, Robert Cover stands out as one whose jurisprudence
was dedicated to separating the concepts of law and the state, or established order, and the
following discussion builds on his ideas. See, eg., Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982
Term - Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HAgv.L.REv.4 (1983). Cover, of course, was
not alone. Other recent examples include: William E. Forbath, The Shapingof the American
Labor Movement, 102 HAnv. L. REv.1111 (1989); James Gray Pope, Labor's Constitutionof
Freedom, 106 YALE LJ.941 (1997); Walter Otto Weyrauch & Maureen Anne Bell, Autonomous Lawmaking: The Case of the "Gypsies," 103 YALE LJ.323 (1993). My own work has
also insisted on this separation. See. e.g., Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the
State, 70 N.C. L. Rv.1389 (1992) (discussing the competition between the legal profession's
law and the law that governs lawyers as articulated by the state).
10. Julia Ward Howe, Battle Hymn of the Republic 9 ATLANTic MONnI Y 10 (1862),
reprintedin Tim BEst LovaD PoEMs OF -mAM iucAN PEoPLE 356 (Hazel Felleman ed.,
1936). There is more than a little irony in beginning this section on rural voices with lines
written in celebration of our national union, during the Civil War, by a woman, who was born
in that most urban of places, New York City. That these lines nonetheless capture much of
the righteous rage now spewing from parts of our heartland should serve as a reminder of
how American these voices are.
11. See T.C. Brown, Uncommon Justice: Common-Law Courtsa Fast-GrowingForumfor
'Patriots' Battling the American Government and Legal System TBm PLAiN DEALER
(Cleveland), Mar. 2, 1997, at 1A ("Common-law courts - the judicial arm of the Christian
Patriot movement - comprise the fastest growing segment of these organizations, with followers in all 50 states .... At this time last year, followers... were evident in only 30
states."); see also Stephen Braun, Their Own Kind ofJustice L.A. Trams, Sept. 5,1992, at Al;
Mark Potok, Common-Law Courts Take on Legal System, USA TODAY, Aug. 28,1995, at IA.
12. See Kriemelmeyer vs. De Facto Corporation State of Wisconsin: Edict from Our One
Supreme Court in and for La Crosse County, Wisconsin, U.S. of A. (July 17,1995) [hereinafter Kriemelmeyer Edict] (unpublished Common Law court papers, on file with author); see
also Braun, supra note 11, at 1A (referring to Ohio Common Law Court as "Our One
Supreme Court"); T.C. Brown, Justice for the Common Man?, PLAiN DEALER (Cleveland),
Dec. 11, 1995, at 1A (same).
13. See Cover, supra note 9, at 4-5.
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"Freemen" or "Sovereign Citizens" and proclaims that our courts
have no jurisdiction over such persons. Sovereign Citizens busy
themselves filing liens against government officials and other nonsovereigns. In our world, these liens are legal nullities, 14 and the
militias' obsession with them seems driven by nothing more than
the capacity of the liens to annoy those against whom they are filed.
Their courts entertain "Quiet-Title Actions," which have nothing to
do with quieting title, as we understand those words, but rather purport to be a gateway to status as a Sovereign Citizen. 15 A person
filing a quiet-title action appears in a Common Law court and
presents proof that he was not born in Washington, D.C., but rather
in one of the 50 states. 16 According to the Common Law, he then
emerges free from the jurisdiction of our courts and government.
If any of this constitutes a world, it is not easy to discern what
kind of world it is, what generated it, or what its purpose might be.
Look again, because even this scanty account contains important
clues about the central values of the people who call this law their
own.
The group took a legal process that declares land to be free
from the claims of others, the quiet-title action, and transformed it
into a process that declares people to be free. It took a method of
encumbering real property, the filing of a lien, and turned that into
a weapon for punishing outsiders. This law seems to have come
from a world in which existence, identity, and land are all but inseparable concepts. It is a law born not from the imagination of
urbanites, but from that of farmers for whom land means something
different from what it means for those who dwell in apartments and
walk crowded city streets.
14. See, eg., Terpstra v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 483 N.E.2d 749, 757 (Ind. Ct. App.
1985) (describing these liens as "a mere nullity without any legal effect"); accord, e.g., United
States v. Reeves, 782 F.2d 1323, 1326 (5th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Ryan v. Bilby, 764 F.2d
1325, 1327 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Hart, 701 F.2d 749 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam);
United States v. Shugarman, 596 F. Supp. 186, 192 (E.D. Va. 1984); United States v. Dyke,
568 F. Supp. 820, 822 (D. Or. 1983); Johnson v. Murray, 656 P.2d 170, 176-77 (Mont. 1982);
Shutt v. Moore, 613 P.2d 1188, 1191 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980).
15. See Nature and Threat of Violent Anti-Government Groups in America: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. of the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 135 (1995)
(statement of Ted Almay, Superintendent, Ohio Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation) [hereinafter Anti-Government GroupsHearings];Bill Ellwood, Constitutional Court
of We the People in and for the United States of America, Our One Supreme Court, Common Law Venue, Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction, a Superior Court Sitting with the Power
of a Circuit Court and United States District Court for the People in and for Franklin
County, Ohio State Republic, United States of America 15 (Oct. 1995) (unpublished handbook, on file with the author) [hereinafter Ohio Handbook] (urging people to file quiet-title
actions to remove themselves from the jurisdiction of the federal and state governments).
16. See Anti-Government Groups Hearings,supra note 15, at 138 (statement of Ted
Almay, Superintendent, Ohio Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation) (explaining the importance of establishing that one was not born in the District of Columbia).
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To a farmer, land is identity. "It is his connection to God; it is
his religion, his nationality, his family's heritage, and his legacy to
his children."' 7 To lose one's land is thus much more than an economic disaster; it is a cultural and spiritual disaster as well. The
farm crisis of the 1980s was just such a cataclysmic event for many
in America's heartland. In Rural Radicals, Stock writes:
From North Dakota to Texas and Alabama to Colorado, farmland
that had been held by families for more than a century was lost to
foreclosure in less than half a decade. Children whose families grew
food endured the humiliation of being unable to buy it for themselves.... As farms failed, so did rural businesses; towns began to
resemble ghettos with boarded-up stores and abandoned buildings in
the midst of verdant pastures, fields, and orchards. Families neglected
health care and waited for hours in lines for emergency food distributions. Not surprisingly, rates 8of rural suicides increased. So did domestic violence and murder.'
To make sense of experience when one's world is crumbling is
no simple task. As Stock describes it, two paths presented themselves to rural Americans. A new world could be constructed
through alliances with urban labor and the urban poor, the other
groups "who found themselves on the short end of the Reagan
revolution" (Stock, p. 162). That is, farmers could understand their
experience through the narratives of Jesse Jackson and his Rainbow
Coalition - narratives that berated big business, cold capitalism,
and an unresponsive government that displayed equal disregard toward all manner of ordinary folks of all races and creeds. And
some farmers, like those who packed a small church in Iowa to hear
Reverend Jackson preach, did just that (Stock, p. 162). Alternatively, farmers could understand what had happened to them
through the narratives of the Far Right - narratives that explained
17. CoRcoPA,

supra note 4, at 11.

18. Stock, p. 157 (footnote omitted). In Gathering Storm, Dees and Corcoran seem to
deny that the farm crisis played a major role in the rise of the militia/Christian Patriot movement. Dees & Corcoran, p. 3. More precisely, they suggest that it was not until the 1990s,
when those who appealed to displaced farmers and other downtrodden inhabitants of rural
America learned to mask the racism of their message, that the movement took off. See Dees
& Corcoran, pp. 3-4. Their rejection of the farm crisis as a pivotal event is, however, belied
not only by Stock's book but by the accounts of almost all other observers. See, e.g., Gene
Fadness, Agents, This Time, Act Cautiously, IDAHO FALLS POST REG., Mar 28,1996, at A10
(tracing roots of movement to farm crisis of the 1980s); Jim Gallagher et al., "Common-Law
Courts" Grow From Conviction, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 14, 1996, at 1A (same);
Frank Santiago, Oelwein Bank Case Clogged by "Court," Das MonsM REG., Sept. 10, 1995
(same). Indeed, Corcoran himself emphasizes the importance of the farm crisis in his earlier
work. See CORCORAN, supranote 4, at 35-36,40-41. On the other hand, the suggestion made
by Dees and Corcoran that a shift in narrative focus played an important role in this movement's growth seems to be on target. They identify that shift as a move to less overtly racist
messages, which is part of the story. I believe, however, that the adoption of overlapping and
reinforcing narratives, see infra text accompanying notes 35-56, explains the expansion of this
movement. As the normative material upon which this world view was based expanded and
grew more complex and sophisticated, the base of people to whom it appealed grew.
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how the federal government had been captured by un-American
enemies - Zionists intent on destroying this Christian nation and
its embodiment, the White Christian farmer to whom the land truly
belonged. "[W]hy would this nation's most honorable citizens suffer so terribly unless the government had been subverted by its enemies?" (Stock, p. 163).
Stock's book is dedicated to showing that both sets of narratives
have strong, deep roots in rural America. Stock argues that rural
America has long been home to a belief-set that defies neat Left/
Right distinctions. In the end, however, Stock is forced to admit
that in today's rural America this belief-set has proved relatively
inhospitable to narratives from the Left, while narratives from the
Radical Right have resonated deeply, unleashing enough energy to
disquiet a nation. She writes:
Explanations for the farm crisis that put the blame on un-American
conspirators, Jews and corrupted elites made more sense (and
sounded more familiar) to many rural Americans than the activists on
the left wanted to admit. It certainly felt more comfortable than creating alliances with the urban poor. And to some farm men, it felt
more comfortable than attending support-group meetings or domestic-violence awareness lectures. [Stock, p. 163]
Or listening to Jesse Jackson preach. Explanations offered by
groups like Christian Identity and Posse Comitatus made more
sense. Some rural radicals built a law upon those narratives
designed to replace what they had lost. It should come as no surprise to find at the center of that law precisely what had been at the
center of the destroyed world: land. Equating freedom with quieting title and punishment with the imposition of a lien begins to
make sense. "[A legal] tradition includes not only a corpus juris,
but also a language and a mythos .... " 19 Foreclosures gave birth to
this law, and so its language is the language of foreclosure. Within
the world of American farmers, such language is well understood.
Topography
The Common Law posits two United States of America: theirs,
which is the lawful one, and ours, which is the tyrannical imposter.
The legitimate United States - theirs - is defined by their law; the
illegitimate United States - ours - is also defined by their law our law as understood by their law. Consider how one Common
Law text
affirms the existence of these two worlds and describes
them: 20
19. Cover, supra note 9, at 9.
20. Ohio Handbook, supra note 15, at 9.
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THE Two

"TiiE UNITED STATES"
"The United States"
The Basic Constitution
The First Ten Amendments (Bill of Rights)
Three Branches of Government
(Legislative, Executive, Judicial)
Article III Courts (Constitutional Courts)
A Republic (Republican form of
Government of the 50 Union States.)
Common Law, Equity Law, Admiralty Law
Individual Rights, Property Rights etc.
No direct Taxes, Duties, Imposts, Excises
on commerce only. No taxes on wages.
No property taxes
Substance Money (Gold & Silver)
Law of the Land prevails. (Common Law)
Home of the Sovereign Human Being!

"The United States"
Article I, Section 8 Clause 17
(Ten Miles Square Area only)
Article I, Clause 3
Civil War Amendments
Civil Rights Act
Article I, Section 8 Clause 9
Legislative Courts
A Legislative Democracy
Statutory Law, Rules, Regulations
Privileges in lieu of Rights (by contract)
Taxes on all privileges, property
Taxes on wages (income tax)
Law of the Sea prevails. (Admiralty Law)
Home of the 14th Amendment Slave!

The Common Law understanding is that both these worlds exist
now in the same physical space,21 one legitimately and one illegitimately. This group does not content itself with asserting that its
world should exist; rather, it asserts that its world does exist. It is
"home" to Sovereign Citizens and they live there. 22 We, on the
other hand, live elsewhere, according to them and according to us.
But how they imagine that "elsewhere" is not how we imagine it.
They believe that we live in a world very different from the world in
which we would claim to live. For example, they believe that in our
world, admiralty law prevails and the Uniform Commercial Code
has somehow replaced the Constitution of the United States as our
fundamental social contract. The world they think we inhabit is foreign to us, but they see us living there nonetheless.23
21. See Howard Freeman, The UCC Connection: Free Yourself from Legal Tyranny 18
(1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author):
If you are charged with Willfd failure to file an income tax 1040 form, that is a law
for a different nation ....
YOU are a NON RESIDENT ALIEN to 'that nation'. It is a foreign corporationto
you. It is NOT the REPUBLIC of the continental united States coming after you. It is a
foreign nation... a legislative democracy of a foreign nation, and, as such, can NOT
rightfully compel a performance of you, since you have signed NO contract with the
United States ....
22. For example, one Common Law text identifies the Common Law court in Wisconsin
as being located "without" the United States and speaks of having expatriated to another
place. See Kriemelmeyer Edict, supra note 12, at 1.
23. The above discussion might lead many to wonder how these people differ from
people we might call insane. "[Tlhe fact that we can locate [the part we play] in a common
'script' renders it 'sane' - a warrant that we share a nomos." Cover, supra note 9, at 10.
From the perspective of a particular normative system, a large group of people who live in
another nomos may very well be labeled "mad." But collective "madness" can still be distinguished from the truly idiosyncratic normative behavior for which I wish to reserve the term
"insane." The reader should not, however, mistake my insistence on a distinction between
madness and insanity for an assertion on my part that the terms are commonly used in the
manner I suggest. A dominant normative system - the law of a land or the people who live
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No one can construct, or reconstruct, a legal order from
precepts strung together on a list, whether it is either of the lists
provided above2 or one that you or I might construct detailing the
fundamental tenets of our constitutional order. More material is
needed. For law to constitute a world, a nomos,25 there must be
material that explains the purpose of the precepts and what they
demand of citizens. Narrative is that material. Only through narratives can rules be "supplied with'26history and destiny, beginning and
end, explanation and purpose.
The Common Law precepts are given coherent shape through
biblical and secular narratives that parallel and reinforce one another. The biblical narratives that explicate Common Law precepts
emanate from a religious sect called Christian Identity. Identity
teaches that White Americans are the true Israelites of the Bible,
the chosen people of God.27 A racist, anti-Semitic offshoot of

that law - may well label certain acts of resistance to the dominant nomos "insanity" even
when they are based on alternate normative systems. In fact, the definition of "insanity" in
all cultures may be tied inextricably to the breadth of the culture's acceptance of alternative
normative visions. See generally THOMAS S.SzAsz, Trm MANuFAcruRE OF MADNESS (2d
ed. 1977) (arguing that the distinction I have drawn between madness and insanity is specious
and that neither phenomenon is ever anything more than adherence to a normative vision
labeled "mad" by the dominant culture). Nonetheless, I maintain that acts based on a
shared, albeit radical, normative vision can be distinguished from idiosyncratic acts whose
normative meaning is understood only by the actor.
24. The Common Law, like all law, not only identifies certain precepts as binding, but
also exiles others. Under the Common Law, the income tax is unconstitutional. See, e.g.,
Ohio Handbook, supra note 15, at 9 (identifying "[n]o taxes on wages" or property as a
binding precept of the United States under the Common Law); see also United States v.
Kaun, 827 F.2d 1144, 1146, 1149 (7th Cir. 1987) (describing the community's rejection of
income taxation). Social security numbers are a mark of second-class citizenship. See
Willson Cummer, Jurors Convict Montville Driver Who Doubts Laws, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), Apr. 27, 1996, at IB; Peter Larsen & Teri Sforza, Common-Law Believers Go
Their Own Way, ORANGE CouNTY REo., May 18, 1996, at Al. State laws requiring licenses
to drive a motor vehicle are a violation of the right to travel under the Common Law. See
Dennis B. Roddy, Conspiracy Theories Are Groups' Lifeblood, PrrrsBUROH PosT-GAZETrE,
Apr. 30, 1995, at Al. Furthermore, federal and state court jurisdiction over Sovereign Citizens is invalid. See Kriemelmeyer Edict, supra note 12, at 17; Ohio Handbook, supra note 15,
at 15.
25. I borrow the word nomos from Professor Cover, who explained its use as follows:
The Hebrew word Torah was translated into the Greek nomos in the Septuagint and
in the Greek scripture and postscriptural writings, and into the English phrase "the
Law." "Torah," like "nomos" and "the Law," is amenable to a range of meanings that
serve both to enrich the term and to obscure analysis of it.... The Hebrew "Torah"
refers both to law in the sense of a body of regulation and, by extension, to the corpus of
all related normative material and to the teaching and learning of those primary and
secondary sources. In this fully extended sense, the term embraces life itself, or at least
the normative dimension of it, and "Torah" is used with just such figurative extension in
later rabbinics.
Cover, supra note 9, at 11 n.31.
26. Id.at 5.
27. See CORCORAN, supra note 4, at 38-39.
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British Israelism, 28 Identity provides a powerful set of narratives
that capture many of the themes echoed by other segments of the
militia/Christian Patriot movement; it supplies a mythos that serves
to unify a community of many subgroups with otherwise competing
narratives.2 9 Taking care throughout their book to explain that not
all militia members or self-proclaimed patriots are Identity members, avowed racists, or committed anti-Semites, Dees and
Corcoran also make clear how dominant Identity narratives are
within the larger movement and explain
how they are used to bind
30
together and inspire this community.
An edict issued by the "one Supreme Court in and for La
Crosse county, Wisconsin, ' '31 provides a striking example of how
28. British Israelism is a religious movement born in the 1800s that identifies the Whites
of Europe with the lost tribes of Israel. See icL (discussing the origins of British Israelism and
explaining that religion's connection to Christian Identity); see also Stock, p. 169.
29. Leonard Zeskind, a researcher and analyst for the Center for Democratic Renewal,
an Atlanta-based group that monitors racist and anti-Semitic activities in this country, argues
that the Christian Identity movement has been able to create what was heretofore lacking
among competing and geographically separate American hate groups: "a practical working
unity." See CORCORAN, supra note 4, at 38 (quoting Zeskind) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Michael Barkun, a professor of political science at Syracuse University and author
of a book on religion and the Radical Right, MICHAEL BARKUN, RELIGION AND THE RAcisT
Riaorr (rev. ed. 1997), explains that while the Radical Right is made up of many subgroups
- "[s]urvivalists, militias, Klans, neo-Nazis, Christian identity churches, skinheads and
Christian constitutionalists" - their "views find their fullest expression in the Christian Identity movement," which Barkun calls "the most significant religious manifestation on the
extreme right." Michael Barkun, Militias, Christian Identity and the Radical Righ 112
C iA
CENtRY 738, 738, 740 (1995) [hereinafter Barkun, Militias]. This point is also
made in GatheringStorm. See Dees & Corcoran, p. 18; see also John Kifner, The Gun Network N.Y. TnAms, July 5,1995, at Al ("There is a common religious thread, called Christian
Identity, running through many of these groups ...according to studies by the AntiDefamation League of B'na B'rith and others.").
30. See Dees & Corcoran, pp. 18-24. For example, they describe the preachings of Pastor
Pete Peters, an Identity minister. Peters recounts how the biblical figure Gideon threshed his
wheat by the winepress to keep it hidden from the Midian tax collectors. See Dees &
Corcoran, p. 20 (quoting Pastor Peters). "Gideon was a tax protester who would today be
condemned," but, Pastor Peters explains, he is a hero in the Bible. Dees & Corcoran, p. 20
(quoting Pastor Peters (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Gideon story, according to
Identity leaders, has present implications for the righteous. Pastor Peters describes our country as one "invaded by hordes of illegal aliens and sons of the East who bleed a welfare
system whose blood bank is the hearts of millions of laboring, overtaxed Americans." Dees
& Corcoran, p. 20 (quoting Pastor Peters (internal quotation marks omitted)). Dees and
Corcoran also describe Peters's use of three biblical figures - Shadrach, Meshach, and
Abednego, who "defied King Nebuchadnezzer's decree that all.., bow before his golden
image." Dees & Corcoran, p. 20 (quoting Pastor Peters). That story is used to celebrate
those today who refuse to "file, report, register, pay, submit, remit, buckle up, get a sticker,
take a test, get a license." Dees and Corcoran, p. 20 (quoting Pastor Peters (internal quotation marks omitted)). Peters also uses the figure of Jesus Christ, who urged his apostles to
sell their garments and buy swords. The M-16, according to Peters, is the modem equivalent
of the sword of which Jesus spoke. See Dees & Corcoran, p. 21. While Rural Radicals mentions Christian Identity in several places, Stock, pp. 1-2, 143-44, and provides a brief rundown
of the group's religious beliefs, Stock, p. 169, it does not give the reader a sense of how
important the group's narratives have become to the larger militia/Christian Patriot
movement
31. See Kriemelmeyer Edict, supra note 12, at 1.
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some segments of the Common Law movement use the biblical narratives central to Christian Identity to support the Common Law.
The edict begins with a statement of purpose: to establish the legal
status of its author, the Honorable "Justice" Frederick G.
Kriemelmeyer, as a freeman "duly expatriated from 'within' the
United States," 32 - that is, expatriated from the United States that
you and I recognize33 - and to establish that the Common Law
court is 4the only lawfully constituted court in the legitimate United
States. 3
The edict provides a lengthy biblical exegesis intended to establish that White people 35 are the sons of Adam, the only form of
man recognized in the Bible.3 6 Jews, African Americans, and other
people of color are the "beasts" of the Bible, the descendants of
37
Cain and Satan, the issue of Eve's copulation with the serpent.
White Americans, in contrast, are the true nation of Israel, God's
chosen people to whom the "land" was given.38 That land is the
"Land" referred to in our Constitution - the land in which the
Constitution is to be the supreme law.3 9 The Bible was written for
32. Id.
33. It is clear that the edict is intended to take Kriemelmeyer out of the jurisdiction of
our United States, as opposed to their United States. For example, the sentence I have
quoted in the text goes on to define which United States is being referred to: "[T]he de facto
corporation District of Columbia and its possessions, territories and the [de facto] compact
party states .... " Id.(alteration in original). Notice that the sentence recognizes that there
is in existence a party of states organized by compact. Notice too that that compact is not
identified as the Constitution, which the Common Law insists that we have abandoned, and
that the edict recognizes the factual existence of our United States but implicitly denies its
legitimacy.
34. See id. The edict purports to offer proof from "various sources... by the judicial
power and judicial authority vested in me." Id. It explains its intent to offer "the following
proofs of this sovereign Freeman character's perfect, vested, absolute and Unalienable Right
for our Self-appointment as a 'de jure' 'Justice, Notary Public, and etc.,' in and for La Crosse
county [de jure], in our [de jure] country of Wisconsin, United States of America." Id. at 2
(alteration in original). So powerful will these proofs be that "even the most jaded mind
[could] comprehend [them], fraternal organization State Bar of Wisconsin notwithstanding."
Id.In other words, lawyers are the one group not expected to accept, or to admit the validity
of, the law set forth in the document.
35. Here I am using the term "White people" to mean Caucasian Christians and to exclude all others, which is how I understand the term to be used in this edict.
36. See Kriemelmeyer Edict, supra note 12, at 3.
37. See; eg., id at 6 (second alteration in original):
In the Jewish Talmud, (book) Yebamoth 103a-103b, it says that the serpent 'copulated'
with Eve. ... [I]n Leviticus 20:15-16, "If a man lies with a beast,he shall be put to death.
If a woman approachesany beast and lies with it, you shall kill the woman and the beast;
they shall be put to death, their blood in upon them." Here, most, if not all preachers of
the Judeo-Christian [preachers mixing the jew's laws [Talmud] with that of the Biblical
Law] churches will say that this means that man nor woman [is] to lie with a beast, such
as a cow, horse, etc., which is true, but this is not the 'beast' that our Lord was talking
about. It is the colored people, and the jews, who are the descendants of Cain.
38. See id.at 2, 10-11.
39. See id.at 3 (citing U.S. Cossr. art. VI, c.2 (Supremacy Clause)).
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the chosen people to be their law,40 and the chosen people embodied that law in our original Constitution,41 which has since been
supplanted by "man made constitutions [corporations] contrary to
the Word of Almighty God." 42 The edict identifies Congress and
state legislatures with the prophets of Baal and proclaims the "man
made laws" passed by those bodies invalid.43 It distinguishes between God's law and laws passed under "color of law," which are
false and invalid laws passed by legislatures.44 To apply for welfare,
or for a social security card, marriage license, or driver's license
from the government, is to give up one's status as a "freeman" and
become
a slave, whom the agents of government may "'tax' at their
45
will."

This story explains the importance of land to its community in
sacred, noncontingent, noneconomic terms. The chosen people
were promised the land by God - a land in which they might follow His Law. The community's quiet-title process is invested with
solemn significance by this story: those with clear title to the land
are the chosen people. In a world in which this story is central, a
quiet-title action can be understood as a gateway to a new world,
the Promised Land. By fusing group identity with the land, the
story also invests the filing of liens with new significance. Those
who afflict the chosen people are surely the issue of Cain. What
better way to mark these enemies, the unchosen, than with a cloud
on their title? Surely, that is a mark that the chosen understand.
40. See, e.g., id. at 3-4:
[T]he "Ammonite and the Moabites", which are a different race of People to that of the
'white race, "Israel"; will never be able to enter into the assembly of the Lord.
The one main issue is that this new 'form' of "man" [Adam] is separate from all the
other races ....
Remember that the Bible was written for only one race of people ....
41. This point is implied, although not explicitly stated, in the edict. For example, the
edict emphasizes that those who adopted the Preamble to the Constitution meant the words
"WeThe People" to embrace "the white race and none other. The Preamble emanated from
and for the People so designated by the words, 'To Ourselves andfor our posterity."' Id. at 25
(quoting Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 406, 480 (1857)).
42. Id. at 22 (alteration in original).
43. See id. at 17 (alteration in original):
"... the four hundred and fifty prophets of Baal. .. "represent our so-called congress and/or the state legislators [Satan] of today, creating and passing man made laws,
regulations, codes, rules and policies under "color of law."
How many of the People of Israel [Adam/white race] have rejected the words of
Almighty God, and rejected their "faith" [surety] in Almighty God, to worship man
made laws; "color of law"....
44. Id.
45. See id. at 17-18:
Once you have applied for these benefits, via your 'application forms', i.e., 'social security card, drivers license, marriage license, etc., from your 'new gods', you have
voluntar[ily] become their new "slaves" to "tax" at their will, for you are no longer
"Free" ie., a 'freeman.
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Notice that the racist theme - that Whites alone are the chosen
people - can be muted or suppressed without altering the story's
ability to invest the quiet-title proceeding or lien filing with significance. If, for example, the story explained how farmers instead of
Whites were the true chosen people, the significance given to quiettitle proceedings and lien filings would remain the same. Indeed,
there is a version of the farmers/chosen people tale that is not racist. The narrative is Jefferson's: "Those who labor in the earth are
the chosen people of God, if ever he had a chosen people, whose
breasts he has made the particular deposit for substantial and genuine virtue."'46 Jefferson further asserted that farmers "are the most
vigorous, the most independent, the most virtuous, and they are
tied to their country, and wedded to its liberty and interests, by the
most lasting bonds. 47
The chosen people theme thus has a resonance outside the hardcore racist Christian Identity movement, which means that some
version of the Identity narrative and the law it has generated can be
embraced by a larger group. The fact that there are multiple versions of the chosen people/rural American myth is testament to the
importance of the tale and demonstrates that it is accepted by communities with otherwise divergent narrative traditions.48
Most Common Law texts, unlike the Kriemelmeyer Edict, do
not retell the chosen people narrative. 49 General references to the
Bible as a source of law are, however, abundant in the group's legal
46. Stock, p. 18 (quoting THOMAS JEFFERSON, NoTEs ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 164-65

(William Reden ed., University of N.C. Press 1955) (1787)).
47. Stock, p. 18 (quoting Thomas Jefferson as quoted in CARL TAYLOR, THm FARMERS'
MovEMENr, 1620-1920, at 59 (1953)).
48. The very nature of narrative renders it unstable; it is difficult to retell a story without
changing it, however slightly. Important narratives - those that form a central part of our
understanding of the world - are in some important, if seemingly paradoxical, way the least
stable of all. That is not only because they are retold more but also because the quest to
unearth their meaning is more urgent and requires more words and new ways of telling.
49. This is not surprising. I would not expect the legal documents from any legal regime
routinely to recount that regime's foundational myths. They simply are taken for granted.
Consider how few of our courts' opinions recount the tale of our Revolution, the framing of
our Constitution, or any of the other narratives that might be considered central to our law.
Indeed, an opinion that recounts a central narrative normally signals either that an extraordinary challenge to the system has been made or that a novel legal step is about to be taken by
the court, which seeks to legitimize the move by tying it to something accepted as
fundamental.
As to the centrality of Identity narratives to the group's understanding of what is lawful,
Dees and Corcoran say this:
[T]hrough ...

interpretations of the Bible ...

Identity gives its followers a sense of

divine guidance and approval to engage in racial hatred, bigotry, and murder. When
Identity counsels "lawful" ways and means, it does not mean local, state, and federal
statutes. It means God's Law. Literally. Therefore, if one accepts the Identity teaching
that Jews are the children of Satan and people of color are subhuman, one can kill with a
clear conscience. It is neither a sin nor is it against the law to murder a race-mixer when
a person is simply following God's commands. Instead it is virtuous. It is righteous.
Dees & Corcoran, p. 21.
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documents.50 Indeed, Common Law is law "pursuant to the Word
of Almighty God." 51
As a source of law, the Bible has two distinct advantages: First,
it has a built-in supremacy clause - that is, it professes to be the
Word of God. Second, it is a relatively familiar and accessible
source. On the other hand, in this country, where the separation of
church and state is a fundamental concept, albeit for some a highly
controversial one, the Bible also has a distinct disadvantage as a
source of law. Any legal understanding that relies exclusively on
the Bible is vulnerable to the claim that it is religion and not law at
all.
Thus, it is not surprising to find that this group does not rely
exclusively on biblical exegesis to justify and define its law. The
secular sources of this community's law can even be glimpsed in the
Kriemelmeyer Edict, which relies on the Bible more heavily than
most Common Law documents. Consider again the statement of
purpose in the edict.52 Like the Declaration of Independence, to
which the edict explicitly refers, 53 the edict begins by promising to
give reasons for the declaration of sovereignty contained therein,
which will convince, we are told, even the most jaded minds. 54
Other Common Law documents similarly rely on the Declaration
of Independence as a source of law.55 It is a central element in the
Common Law nomos.
50. See, e.g., Public Notice, Wisconsin State, Country of Wisconsin, Common Law Venue
Supreme Court, United States of America, Wisconsin State (Organic), La Crosse County,
Trempealeau County et al., To: Office of Supreme Court Clerk in Juneau County (June 13,
1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Wisconsin Rules] (containing rules of Wisconsin Common Law Court and quoting from Matthew 5:33-37), Citizens
Rule Book (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (including quotes from Leviticus,
Isaiah, Hosea, 2 Chronicles, and Acts, along with quotes from George Washington and
Edmund Burke); see also Braun, supra note 11, at Al ("Court officers consult the Bible as
often as they flip through Black's Law Dictionary.").
51. Kriemelmeyer Edict, supra note 12, at 1 (emphasis deleted).
52. See supra text accompanying notes 32-34.
53. It reads:
"That to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their
just Powers from the Consent of the governed, that whenever and [sic] Form of Government becomes destructive of these Ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or abolish it,
.. " Declaration of Independence, 1776, para. 2 (alteration in original).
Kriemelmeyer Edict, supra note 12, at 22.
54. Compare text quoted supranote 34 with THm DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para.
2 (U.S. 1776).
55. One text from the movement refers to three "original documents" - the Declaration
of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights - and reprints each of them in full.
Citizens Rule Book, supranote 50, at 21-60. Another quotes liberally from the Declaration,
pointing out that the colonists had been "very patient" and "did not.., lightly" take the step
of declaring independence and that some of the charges against King George can be made
today against the current regime. EuGENE SCHRODER wHr ifcKi NELLis, CONsTrTON:
FACT OR FICrION 13-14 (1995). Mr. Schroder is the movement's most important legal
scholar.
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Central elements in a nomos are, like symbols in a dream or
other manifestations of the unconscious, "overdetermined." In
other words, they express in a compact fashion multiple themes that
may otherwise be unconnected. The Declaration's importance to
the Common Law is in that sense overdetermined. First, the
Declaration legitimates the nomos it creates by appealing to Godgiven fights. Thus, it is an important text for all communities, including the Common Law community, that proclaim a constitutionalism inspired by religious precepts. Second, it was written by
Jefferson, a Founding Father and the natural patron saint for this
community.5 6

But something even more basic is at work here. In our c6untry,
the Declaration is the text that legitimizes resistance to an established order. It legitimates that resistance through narrative - by
telling a story that portrays the established order as unlawful and
the order to be created by resistance as lawful. Thus, the militia
community, seeking as it does to establish that the existing order is
unlawful and that their order is lawful, appeals to the text respected
by all of us that makes just such a move. "The return to foundational acts can never be prevented or entirely domesticated. '5 7 The
militias use our revolution to justify theirs, daring us to deny both
or neither.
The secular sources for this group's law are hardly exhausted by
the Declaration of Independence. What is perhaps most fascinating
about this law is the rich secular narratives used to justify it. Building in many instances on legal interpretations that at first glance
appear quite conventional, these narratives take some surprising
turns, but there is nothing simplistic about the world of law they
56. Not only did Jefferson celebrate the agrarian life as the foundation of our republic,
calling those who till the land the "chosen people," but as President he:
honored small producers of all kinds, venerated farmers and rural life, and eventually
made hundreds of millions of new acres available for settlers in the West. [His administration] shrank the size and the responsibilities of the federal government and by 1803
had abolished internal taxes and the newly established circuit courts.
Stock, p. 50. Hating taxes and federal courts as this group does, what more perfect model for
a president could there be? Perhaps most important, however, Jefferson was not afraid of a
little revolution now and then. See TAYLOR, supra note 47, at 57 (observing that Jefferson
was "not... altogether unsympathetic with Shay's Rebellion").
57. Cover, supra note 9, at 24. Lincoln used the Declaration in just this way, often referring to it in contexts that must have been heard in the South as encouraging revolutionary
impulses among the enslaved population. See GARRY WILLs, INvENTINo AMERICA:
JEFFERSON's DEcLARATON OF INDEPENDENCE at xvi-xxi (1978). Of course, the South also

invoked the Declaration as a justification for dissolving the bonds of government and instituting a new lawful order. Secession or expatriation is the natural move in an order whose
legitimacy is dependent on those acts. See id. at 82-84 (explaining how our founding myth of
social contract leads Americans to cherish the right of expatriation); EuzAnm KELLEY
BAUER, COMMENTARmS ON THE CONsTrrTnoN, 1790-1860, at 253-308 (1952) (explaining

how secession long occupied a similarly cherished notion).
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create. It includes, for example, an explanation of Erie Railroad
Co. v. Tompkins58 and a place for the Uniform Commercial Code. 59
The following paragraph from Eugene Schroder's Constitution:
Fact or Fiction, a Common Law legal treatise, could be placed in
any high-school textbook without causing much, if any, stir.
The US Constitution was basically the shackles placed on the federal government by a sovereign people. The people possessed Godgiven rights. Those rights were only secured by the constitution. All
rights not specifically
granted to the government were reserved for
the people.60
This almost-standard retelling of our collective beginning nonetheless conveys important information about the community that uses
it to relate the beginnings of its law. First, it establishes a hierarchy
of authority: God, people, the Constitution.61 The point of the
hierarchy is not to render the Constitution invalid as a violation of
the law of God, but rather to justify a method of constitutional interpretation: reading the Constitution as an expression of the
higher authority by which that document is justified. In short, it
explains the use of biblical sources to interpret the law. Second, it
emphasizes that a considerable sphere of authority has been reserved, not by the states but directly by the people. The community
thereby asserts the legitimacy of law that emanates from neither the
federal nor state governments and that challenges both. Finally, the
text stakes out a location for the group in relation to the established
order. By appealing to our collective beginning, the group portrays
its members as redeemers who would restore our world, not as
aliens who would overthrow it.
If the recognized order is in need of redemption, the Common
Law must explain when it fell from its original state of grace. As
"the fall" is a central premise of this nomos, there are multiple narratives dedicated to explaining it. One of the most important of
these narratives dates the fall of legitimate government - the
state's breaking of its constitutional shackles - at 1933 with
President Roosevelt's first official acts. 62 Roosevelt assumed office,
declared a state of emergency and thereby suspended the Constitu58. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

59. See infra notes 103-23 and accompanying text.
60. SCHRODER,supra note 55, at 1; see also, e.g., Eileen Dempsey & Jim Woods, Outside
the Legal System: An Uncommon Approach on Common Law, COLUMBUS DisPATCH,Sept.
10, 1995, at 1A ("In June, 1,000 common-law supporters from 32 states gathered in Wichita,
Kan., where they heard Schroder [lecture on the Common Law].").
61. Notice again that by alluding to the language of the Declaration to link the Constitution to God, the narrative manages to hurdle the church-state separation precept in a manner
well-chosen to fend off objections.
62. Schroder begins his book with a reference to this tale and places this "proof' of the
illegitimacy of the current order before stories that suggest the decline began much earlier in
our history. See SCHRODER,supra note 55, at 1, 25-86.
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tion - all with the aid of a subservient Congress. 63 The unlawfully
declared state of emergency has never been officially rescinded, and
the Constitution remains formally suspended. 64 To demonstrate the
authenticity of this narrative, the Common Law invokes a powerful
form of proof: the established order admits it. Schroder quotes
from a 1973 Senate Report:
A majority of the people of the United States have lived all their
lives under emergency rule. For 40 years, freedoms and governmental
procedures guaranteed by the Constitution have, in varying degrees,
been abridged by laws brought into force by states of [N]ational
emergency .... [I]n the United States, actions taken by government
in times of great cris[i]s have... in important ways shaped the
present
phenomenon of a permanent state of National emergency. 65
This story exists in our world, and here I do mean "our." It can
be found in the pages of mainstream law reviews. 66 The existence
of similar narratives in two communities does not mean, however,
63. See id. at 26-27.
64. See id. at 29.
65. Id. at 4 (quoting S. REP. No. 93-549, at 1 (1973) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(alteration in original)).
66. See, eg., William C. Banks & Alejandro D. Carri6, PresidentialSystems in Stress:
Emergency Powers in Argentina and the United States, 15 MiCH. J. INTL. L. 1, 45-46 (1993)
(footnotes omitted) (quoting Inaugural Address of Franklin D. Roosevelt (Mar. 4,1933), in 2

PuB.

PAPERs

11, 15 (1938)):

With the Great Depression and the eventual election of Franklin Roosevelt, a virtual
revolutionary expansion of presidential emergency powers occurred. In part, Roosevelt
benefitted from broad delegations of authority from Congress, endorsed by the courts.
In part, he acted on his own when, in his words, "unprecedented demand and need for
undelayed action may call for temporary departure" from the Constitution. In the first
100 days of his presidency, President Roosevelt issued the second emergency proclamation in the nation's history, in which he closed the banks and stopped all financial transactions. Congress ratified the President's emergency actions within three days,
establishing a pattern of executive initiative and legislative acquiescence that is still the
norm today. Although the Supreme Court struck down two early sweeping delegations
to Roosevelt, by 1937 the President's threatened Supreme Court packing, his landslide
reelection, and new personnel on the Court produced a majority willing to endorse
emergency measures.
See also Jill Elaine Hasday, Civil Waras Paradigm:Reestablishingthe Rule of Law at the End
of the Cold War, 5 KAN. J.L & PuB. POLY., Winter 1996, at 129 (arguing that the post-Civil
War period provides valuable lessons on how the nation today might find'its way back from
the current state of emergency rule to government based on the rule of law).
Professor Jules Lobel tells a substantially similar tale complete with copious citations to
sources accepted as authoritative in our world. See Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the
Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385 (1989). His article details the steady expansion of
emergency power in our legal order and the failure of Vietnam-inspired legislative efforts to
reverse that trend. Among its conclusions is this:
The effect of both the ideology and reality of permanent crisis has dramatically transformed the constitutional boundaries between emergency and non-emergency powers.
Frst, the premise that emergency was a short, temporary departure from the normal rule
of law is no longer operative. Emergency rule has become permanent.
Id. at 1404 (footnote omitted). Lobel, unlike Schroder, asserts that Congress officially ended
Roosevelt's 1933 state of emergency in the 1970s, see id. at 1401 n.75, but agrees that broad
emergency powers are still available and used by the federal government, see id. at 1412-21.
The status of Roosevelt's state of emergency is, however, open to question in our world. Jill
Elaine Hasday writes that when Congress acted in 1976:
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that we are looking at similar legal worlds. Two groups may share a
text, like the Declaration of Independence or the Constitution or
Roosevelt's Emergency Proclamation, and even agree on the
authoritative nature of that text as a source of law, without inhabiting the same nomos.67 Similarly, their legal interpretations of authoritative texts may resemble ours. But the Common Law
attaches a significance to the emergency power tale that we do not
- a significance that is out of place in our world.
In our world, the emergency-power tale does not signify that
our entire constitutional order has collapsed. 68 Indeed, it manages
to stand for precisely the opposite proposition: that our constitutional order exists. In our world, this tale is about a blemish on our
system, not a disease that has already proved fatal to it.
Common Law narratives on Reconstruction provide another explanation of the fall of legitimate government. These narratives explain that the Civil War Amendments were not properly ratified by
the states.69 The Common Law narratives thus exile those amendments from the Common Law nomos and locate them exclusively in
our world. Having marked these amendments as the fault line between the two worlds, the Common Law explains how these
amendments transformed our world into one unworthy of freemen.
According to the Common Law, the Fourteenth Amendment 70
created a new and inferior form of citizenship, federal citizenship, to
four states of emergency had not been terminated. In addition to Truman's Korean War
declaration, Franklin Roosevelt's 1933 declaration to handle the banking crisis, Act of
Mar. 9, 1933, ch. 1, 48 Stat. 1 (1933); Nixon's 1970 declaration to cope with the Post
Office strike, Proclamation No. 3972, 3 C.F.R. 473 (1970); and Nixon's 1971 declaration
to meet balance of payment problems, Proclamation No. 4074, 3 C.F.R. 60 (1971), were
still in effect. Most commentators assume that the National Emergencies Act terminated these states of emergency. But Congress may not have this authority. Whether
the four states of emergency are still in effect has not been tested by litigation.
Hasday, supra, at 149 n.154 (citation omitted).
67. See Cover, supra note 9, at 7 ("If there existed two legal orders with identical legal
precepts and identical, predictable patterns of public force, they would nonetheless differ
essentially in meaning if, in one of the orders, the precepts were universally venerated while
in the other they were regarded by many as fundamentally unjust.").
68. Hasday, whose rhetoric on "reestablish[ing] the democratic rule of law," Hasday,
supra note 66, at 143, comes closest to this idea, is still miles away. Instead, like Lobel, she
questions at most the constitutional validity of a circumscribed set of acts taken by our government pursuant to emergency rule, not the constitutional authority of the government in
general.
69. See Citizens Rule Book, supranote 50, at 25 (referring to the dubious legality of these
Amendments); SCHRODER, supra note 55, at 133 (describing the Civil War Amendments as
war amendments of questionable force during peacetime).
70. The Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the clause that purportedly
created this new class of citizenship. That clause states: "All persons born or naturalized in
the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and
of the State wherein they reside." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1. Mainstream narratives
explain this clause as a repudiation of the Dred Scott decision, which held that no African
American, free or slave, could be a citizen of either a state or the United States, see Dred
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), and intended to secure state and federal
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be contrasted with sovereign, state citizenship, recognized by the
original, valid Constitution.71 Through this process our world became the "Home of the 14th Amendment Slave." 72 Instead of incorporating the Bill of Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment denies
those rights, putting in their stead a more limited freedom - protection against interference with "due process" and the denial of
"equal protection." 73
In the Reconstruction narratives, themes from Common Law
biblical narratives return in secular garb. The Common Law community is equated with the original citizens of this nation - that is,
White Americans and the descendants of slaves and their compatriots who willingly accept a form of second-class, Fourteenth Amendment citizenship are exiled to another world and denied rightful
title to the land. The Reconstruction tales echo the "chosen people" theme by identifying community members with those by and
for whom the original, valid Constitution was written.
In our world, as we construct and understand it, the Civil War
Amendments mark the unification of a nation. In the Common
Law nomos they mark the division of one United States into two.
We do not share a history; we do not share a world.
In our world, Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins74 is an important
topographical feature, 75 and in the Common Law construction of
our world, it is also important. 76 Just as the Common Law needs an
account of when we abandoned the Constitution, it needs an account of when we abandoned the common law. Otherwise, the miscitizenship for the freed slaves. See LAURENCE H. TamE, AMERiCAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

§ 5-16, at 356 & n.12 (2d ed. 1988). In "our" legal world, the Amendment did not "create"
federal citizenship but only redefined it to cancel the restrictive definition given in the Dred
Scott case. See iL § 5-16, at 355-56.
71. See Kriemelmeyer Edict, supra note 12, at 23 ("When this Nation was founded each
of the individual sovereign States of this Union has their own Citizens (Capital "C"), a.k.a.,
Freemen characters... but then came the so called 14th Amendment, that added a second
class of citizen."); Ohio Handbook, supra note 15, at 9 (detailing characteristics of two
United States, one "Home of the 14th Amendment Slave"; the other, "Home of the Sovereign Human Being"). But see TRmE, supra note 70, § 5-16, at 355-56 (explaining that while
the concept of United States citizenship was not defined in the original Constitution, the
document acknowledges the existence of such citizenship by referring at various points to
"citizens"). The Dred Scott decision similarly recognized the category of United States citizenship as implicit in the original Constitution. 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 404-05.
72. See supra note 71 (quoting Ohio Handbook, supra note 15, at 9).
73. ScHRODER, supra note 55, at 132-33; see also Laurie Goodstein, 'Agents of God'
Practice a Christianity Few Would Recognize, WASH. Posr, May 20, 1995, at A12 ("The
movement.., divides the nation's population between white 'sovereign state' citizens with
God-given inalienable rights, and non-white '14th Amendment' citizens with illegitimate
'Constitution rights."').
74. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
75. Not only is the case taught to virtually every law student, but we tell many stories to
explain it. See Akhil Reed Amar, Law Story, 102 HARv. L. REv. 688, 696 (1989) (book
review) (explaining that Erie is a "rich" case that supports many different readings).
76. See Freeman, supra note 21, at 4-5.
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sion of the Common Law nomos - to restore the Constitution and
common law - is meaningless. Erie proclaimed: "There is no federal general common law."'77 Another
birthright was forsaken and
78
the Word of God was forsworn.

But Erie renounced federal general common law, not all com-

mon law. 79 Their Common Law, however, is not divisible; it does

not vary from state to state. Their Common Law is Blackstone's, a
form of natural law ordained by God.80 It is the Common Law described by Justice Story in the case Erie overruled, Swift v. Tyson:

"It

will hardly be contended that the decisions of Courts consti-

tute [the common law]. They are, at most, only evidence of what
the laws are."81 Their Common Law was abandoned in Erie, and
an imposter was put in its place.
After Erie, instead of Common Law there is "the law of the
State."82 Enter the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), a document that is enormously important to the Common Law. In searching to explain what law governs in our world in place of the
Constitution and the common law, this community has found its
way to the U.C.C. - the noncommon,
commercial law that Erie
83
supposedly declared supreme.
The basic social contract of our world was once the Constitution
and the Common Law. Now our relationship with our government
is through the Uniform Commercial Code. In speaking to our legal
system, then, Common Law adherents rely on the U.C.C. They
speak the language that their law tells them we will respect. They
remove themselves from our legal order according to their law
through a quiet-title process, but to perfect that removal under our
law -

to get us to accept it -

they follow procedures grounded in

the U.C.C. Their law tells them we must accept that because the
U.C.C. is law we honor.
77. 304 U.S. at 78.
78. See Freeman, supra note 21, at 6 ("Common Law is based on God's Law.");

Kriemelmeyer Edict, supra note 12, at 1 (equating Common Law with the Word of God).
79. As most contemporary mainstream narratives note, Erie left state courts free to continue to articulate their own versions of the common law and bound the federal courts to
accept what the state courts said. See, e.g., Paul J.Mishkin, Some FurtherLast Words on Erie
- The Thread, 87 HAgv.L. REv. 1682 (1974) (celebrating Erie's recognition of the need to
protect the rights of states to make laws in area of their competence).
80. See 1 WmLAM BLAcxorSONE, CoMmrARms *40.
81. Swift v. 'lyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842).
82. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
83. See Freeman, supra note 21 at 4 ("The District Court had decided on the basis of
COMMERCIAL (Negotiable Instruments) LAW, that this man was not under contract with
the Erie Railroad, and therefore he had no standing to sue the company."). The district court
had, in fact, decided that Pennsylvania law, requiring privity of contract, did not govern but
that the common law did, which extended liability to pedestrians foreseeably harmed by the
railroad. See F.EmIG JAMEs, JR. & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PRocEDuI
E § 2.35,
at 118 (3d ed. 1985).
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The official comment to section 1-207 explains that it is to be
used "where one party is claiming as of right something which the
other believes to be unwarranted," 84 which is precisely what the
Common Law understands to be happening when our illegitimate
government and courts purport to govern Sovereign Citizens. The
U.C.C. Comment states:
This section provides machinery for the continuation of performance along the lines contemplated by the contract despite a pending
dispute, by adopting the mercantile device of going ahead with delivery, acceptance, or payment "without prejudice," "under protest,"
"under reserve," "with reservation of all our rights," and the like.8 5
Common Law members routinely rely on those phrases when filing
documents with any part of our government or appearing in our
courts.8 6 For example, Common Law adherents who do not give up
their driver's licenses, are advised to write "without prejudice, UCC
1-207" under their signature on the license. 87
Our legal order, as constructed by the Common Law, thus provides a path through which a Sovereign Citizen can exit. Even
more important, our legal order provides an entrance to the
Common Law order. Section 1-103 of the U.C.C. states that contracts are subject to general legal principles of common law (as well
as those of any other applicable law) where that law is not specifically displaced by the U.C.C. 88 Section 1-103 is thus transformed
into "an all-powerful... mantra"8 9 that, according to the Common
Law, requires our courts to apply Common Law to Sovereign Citizens and forces our world to recognize theirs.
Trajectory
I have taken the space to survey some of the law created by this
community - from Erie to the U.C.C. - to demonstrate how creative and sophisticated the legal interpretations constructed by this
84. U.C.C. § 1-207 cmt. (1995).
85. U.C.C. § 1-207 cmt. (1995).
86. See Memorandum from "JME," law clerk to Chief Justice Moyer, to Chief Justice
Moyer of the Ohio Supreme Court, at 6 (Oct. 25,1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author) [hereinafter Moyer Memo] (explaining that "[r]arely do [Common Law adherents]
sign their names without citing to this section or stamping the document 'without prejudice"'); see also Freeman, supra note 21, at 25-26 (explaining the importance of making a
reservation under § 1-207 when appearing in "our" courts); Kriemelneyer Edict, supra note
12, at 33 ("'Without prejudice' with explicit reservation of all unalienable Rights, waiving
none, 'without recourse' (citing Wisconsin equivalent to U.C.C. § 1-207)).
87. Freeman, supra note 21, at 13-14.
88. See U.C.C. § 1-103 (1995). Common Law adherents of § 1-103 have cited our courts
extensively. See eg., Moyer Memo, supra note 86, at 6.
89. Moyer Memo, supra note 86, at 6.
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community are. 90 But sophisticated interpretations are not the
same as law. We reach here the crux of the matter: What makes
this community's interpretations more than academic musings?
The militia movement's interpretations are not just stories; they
are stories and precepts intended to guide behavior. It is the commitment to act in accordance with the stories and norms that makes
this material law.91 Law, as opposed to other forms of normative
discourse, seeks to "impose meaning on [a resistant reality] ... and

then to restructure it in the light of that meaning. ' 92 That is what
separates law from literature; the judge's words from the philosopher's; and this community's narratives from those of others.
"Martyrdom, for all its strangeness to the secular world of contemporary American Law, is a proper starting place for understanding the nature of legal interpretation. '93 It is the proper starting
place because it reminds us that law "is never just a mental or spiritual act." 94 Moreover, as Gathering Storm shows us, martyrdom is
no longer alien to the contemporary American scene, 95 nor are acts
90. There are other paths in this law that are as complex and creative as the one I have
outlined above, but I do not want to take the space here to retrace them. In my earlier
elaboration of this group's law, I provide an additional example: the transformation of our
courts from courts exercising Common Law and equity jurisdiction to courts exercising admiralty jurisdiction exclusively. See Koniak, supra n.*, at 85-86.
91. See Cover, supranote 9, at 45 ("The transformation of interpretation into legal meaning begins when someone accepts the demands of interpretation and, through the personal
act of commitment, affirms the position taken.").
92. RONALD DwolmN, LAw's EMPn 47 (1986) (emphasis added; emphasis in original
deleted). I have taken liberties with Professor Dworkin's words. He used the words "an
institution" where I have substituted in brackets "a resistant reality." Even more important,
his emphasis is different. He wrote: "impose meaning on an institution... and then to
restructure it in the light of that meaning." My change in emphasis is meant to indicate a
change in meaning.
There is more than a little irony in my misquotation of Professor Dworkin. In Law's
Empire, Professor Dworkin all but ignores the importance of action to law and the violence
that thereby inheres as legal empires collide. That is precisely what I mean to highlight. See
Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE LJ.1601, 1602 n.2, 1611 n.24 (1986)
(criticizing Dworkin's failure to address the violence inherent in law).
In an early draft of Violence and the Word, which Professor Cover gave me to read, the
material in those footnotes was more fully explicated in the text. I commented that the critique detracted from the thrust of the article and should be shortened and relegated to the
notes. Professor Cover told me that he had just read Law's Empire and could not resist
responding to what he had read, but that on reflection it would probably be better to save a
full-blown response to another time and place. Cover died shortly thereafter. After his
death, I was helping his wife clean out his study and came across a yellow pad filled with
several pages of longhand. These scribblings appeared to be the beginning of a book review
of Law's Empire entitled "And He Just Couldn't See." All that remains in print of Professor
Cover's thoughts on Law's Empire is in the footnotes I have cited. Because I know that the
material in them was important to Professor Cover, I here draw special attention to them and
hope that some readers will examine what he wrote there with care.
93. Cover, supra note 92, at 1604.
94. Id.at 1605.
95. The photo section of GatheringStorm begins with pictures of Kahl; Robert Matthews,
founder of The Order, who died in a siege with the FBI in 1984; and Richard Wayne Snell, a
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of terrorism or other acts of armed resistance
that demonstrate
96
commitment to an alternative legal order.
Martyrs proclaim the extant reality of a community's law by refusing to renounce that law when faced with great suffering and the
prospect of imminent death.97 One sign that this community has
law is its obsession with martyrs. Vicki and Samuel Weaver, the
woman and child killed at Ruby Ridge, are two martyrs of this
movement. 98 Gordon Kahl is another. Having vowed to resist any
attempt by the lawless forces of our government to arrest him for
failing to pay his taxes, and having made good on that vow in a gun
battle that left two dead and four wounded, Kahl holed up on a
farm in rural Arkansas. 99 "More than one hundred federal, state,
and local law enforcement officers assaulted the building" (Dees &
Corcoran, p. 15). They showered the building with bullets, set it on
fire, and shot thousands of rounds of ammunition into the building
as it burned.100
A commitment to kill or be killed is a serious commitment indeed. If the Common Law demanded that level of commitment of
each member of the community in response to any and all demands
by our government insisting that our law be followed, there would
in short order be few members of this community left. And given
the vast array of violence at our government's disposal, none of
those few would be around long.
But the Common Law does not demand blood at every turn, nor
does it leave questions of how and when to resist our government to
the conscience of the individual. The tales of martyrdom so central
to this community's nomos celebrate and affirm the use of violence
Christian Identity leader who killed a black state trooper and a pawnshop owner who Snell
believed was Jewish. Snell was executed on April 19, 1995. Dees & Corcoran, pp. 176-77.
96. As Professor Cover observed:
Martyrdom is not the only possible response of a group that has failed to adjust to or
accept domination while sharing a physical space. Rebellion and revolution are alternative responses when conditions make such acts feasible and when there is a willingness
not only to die but also to kill for an understanding of the normative future that differs
from that of the dominating power.
Cover, supra note 92, at 1605.
97. See id.
at 1604-05 ("[The] triumph [of the martyr] - which may well be partly imaginary - is the imagined triumph of the normative universe - of Torah, Nomos, [Law] over the material world of death and pain.").
98. "To those in the Patriot movement the siege at Ruby Ridge wasn't just an attempt to
arrest one man. Rather, it was an attack on a way of life and the U.S. Constitution [as this
community understands that law]. It was a sign of just how far a federal government - no
longer of the people, by the people, and for the people [but now lawless] - would go to
impose its tyranny upon freedom-loving [law-abiding] Americans." Dees & Corcoran, pp.
30-31.
99. Dees & Corcoran, pp. 14-15. At the end of Rural Radicals Catherine Stock also tells
an abbreviated version of Kahl's saga. Stock, p. 171.
100. For a full (and riveting) account of Kahl's life and death, see CORCORAN, supra note
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in the name of the community's law, but they also affirm the value
of caution. Kahl, after all, ended up dead. 101 "[T]exts of resistance,
like all texts, are always subject to an interpretative process that
limits the situations in which resistance is a legitimate response." 10 2
The Common Law's texts of resistance distinguish between actions
expected of adherents and actions that would be celebrated but are
not expected.
The organized state reserves for itself a near-exclusive license to
use force and relies on that license as a primary method of affirming
its law;' 03 it insists that people do what the law "requires" or else.
Thus, when the state means something to stand as law, we expect it
to speak in imperatives. When the state fails to act in accordance
with the imperatives it speaks - fails to demonstrate by action its
insistence that the norm expressed as an imperative is to be obeyed
"or else" - it creates uncertainty about the status of the norm as
law.
Private groups with law, on the other hand, risk state force anytime they try to back up their law with violence; unlike the state
they must be chary in their use of "must." The power of the state
"put[s] a high price on [the group's] interpretations."' 1 4 Private
groups thus typically express their commitments in terms of what is
expected, not of what is required. Furthermore, in the realm of the
expected, there is what is expected now and what might be expected later.
In the Common Law nomos, what is expected now are nonviolent acts: relinquishing one's social security card' 05 and driver's
license,' 06 relying on the U.C.C. in dealing with the government,
and invoking Common Law court process to declare oneself a
Sovereign Citizen. But the Common Law's insistence that our government has abandoned the Constitution makes even these nonviolent moves risky for group members.
In our country, most communities that seek to maintain a law of
their own use the Constitution to establish their independence from
state regulation. For example, religious communities use the Free
101. As one of Kahl's mourners put it, "He did what a lot of us would like to do, but
don't dare to." Id. at 255 (internal quotation marks omitted).
102. Cover, supra note 9, at 50.
103. Id. at 12-16 (explaining how the state maintains law primarily in one mode and private groups primarily in another).
104. Id. at 50.
105. See Kriemelmeyer Edict, supranote 12, at 23. It is difficult to imagine a more perfect symbol for our nomos, as it is portrayed in the Common Law, than a federally issued
social security card, concrete and ubiquitous evidence of the new government that took over
after the New Deal.
106. See Roddy, supra note 24, at Al (describing theory on driver's license and right to
travel).
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Exercise Clause of the First Amendment; journalists, the Free Press
Clause; and the legal profession, the Sixth Amendment. Groups
use constitutional precepts as boundary rules because they understand that in our world the Constitution is supreme law. In other
words, if they can convince us that the Constitution protects their
nomic autonomy, then their law wins. The Common Law makes
this promising strategy unavailable because it denies that the
Constitution is supreme law in our nomos. Members are thus left
citing the U.C.C. to us to justify their claim that our government
lacks power over them, rendering their appeal for nomic autonomy
incomprehensible.
This move has real costs for the Common Law community. To
render itself unintelligible in the face of force is to invite the use of
that force. Thus, while invoking the U.C.C. is in itself a nonviolent
move, as is driving with no license plates or driver's license, all of
these moves invite violent responses.
Having thus invited violence, the Common Law texts detail the
response that community members may take. They authorize
Sovereign Citizens to file liens against the property of government
agents who attempt to enforce state law against them.107 These
liens impose real costs for defying the Common Law claim of sovereignty; the process to remove these liens can be costly and timeconsuming.108 The liens thus make members of our world feel the
power of the Common Law, if only for a short time.
Liens are not the only way in which the Common Law makes
itself felt in our world; the Common Law has appropriated other
pieces of our corpus juris, and it authorizes its members to seek
redress in our courts based on Common Law interpretations of
these pieces of our law. For example, Common Law adherents file
Bivens'0 9 suits - suits alleging that government agents have acted
outside the scope of their authority, violated the Constitution, and
thereby caused injury." 0 The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (RICO) statute"" has also been appropriated to express the Common Law idea that the government is a corrupt organization engaged in a conspiracy to deny the rights of Sovereign
107. See Anti-Government Groups Hearings, supra note 15, at 156-57 (excerpting

"Militiaman's Newsletter" that details five-step process for filing Common Law lien and asserts that "[a]s of this time 'Freemen' have deposited billions of dollars in liens").
108. See Erin Hallisey, Lien and Mean, S.F. CHRoN., July 16, 1995, at 1/Zi.
109. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971) (holding that under certain circumstances a party may bring a damages action against
government agents for violations of constitutional rights).
110. See e.g., Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621, 623 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (seeking damages under Bivens from federal agents who "unlawfully" collected taxes from these
Sovereign Citizens); Sherwood v. United States, No. C-96-2223-JSB, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18682, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 1996) (same).
111. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994).
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Citizens.112 By making us defendants in our own courts, the
on people in our world, for reCommon Law again exacts costs
113
sponding to a lawsuit is costly.
Although Common Law adherents use our courts to seek redress against our government and its agents, the Common Law
does not concede that the jurisdiction possessed by our courts to
punish our government, its agents, or anyone else in our legal
world '1 4 is exclusive. Common Law courts also have jurisdiction
over people in our United States. While most legal scholars write
as if the only courts in this country were those maintained by the
states, the Common Law community is not the only community in
America that has established courts.11 5 Nonetheless, I would venture to guess that few, if any, other private courts purport to exercise jurisdiction over people outside their group without those
people's consent. The Common Law courts do just that. These
courts thus represent a serious commitment by community members to restructure reality in accordance with the law they speak.
For those who would deny the right of our nomos to continue,
no better target exists than the people who enforce its norms.
Those people include elected officials of the government; agents of
the Internal Revenue Service and other federal agencies; federal,
state and local law-enforcement officers; and our judges. Common
11 6
Law courts have asserted jurisdiction over all these people.
112. See Sherwood, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18682, at *7, *28-*29 (involving an attempt to
use RICO to establish that the federal government is an enterprise run through a pattern of
racketeering by its agents, federal employees).
113. While Common Law adherents thus make use of our courts, it would be a mistake to
think that this signifies acceptance of our nomos. While appealing to material that is part of
our corpus, they retain the idioms of the Common Law. Thus, to challenge the legality of
past foreclosure proceedings, see United States v. Hilgeford, 7 F.3d 1340, 1341 (7th Cir. 1993)
(describing previous quiet-title actions brought by defendant to challenge bank's earlier foreclosure on farm mortgage on the ground that Hilgeford possessed "superior title to the land,
based on a land patent," undoubtedly issued by a Common Law court), or the collection of
taxes by the federal government, see Harrell v. United States, 13 F.3d 232,233 (7th Cir. 1993)
(involving suit filed under federal "quiet title" act, 28 U.S.C. § 2410 (1994), to challenge levy
on wages by IRS); Sherwood, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18682, at *6 (seeking, inter alia, quiet
title as a means of establishing that no federal taxes could be imposed on the plaintiffs), the
Common Law adherent comes to our courts and files a quiet-title action.
114. Our courts have rejected the Common Law's understanding of the breadth of jurisdiction our courts possess over our government and its agents. See, e.g., Sherwood, 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 18682, at *6, *13 ("This Court has no Jurisdiction because the United States has
not Waived its Sovereign Immunity... Furthermore, the United States' sovereign immunity
cannot be avoided simply by naming agencies of the federal government or their individual
officers and employees."). But see Harrell,13 F.3d at 234-35 (affirming that federal "quiet
title" act waives sovereign immunity and that it may be used to challenge a federal tax lien,
but only when the challenge is to the lien as distinct from the tax assessment itselo.
115. For a rare example of a law review article devoted to a private group in this country
with its own law and courts, see Weyrauch & Bell, supra note 9.
116. See Potok, supra note 11, at 1A (reporting on the "flurry of indictment of federal,
state and local officials" issued by Common Law courts (quoting Mike Reynolds, Southern
Poverty Law Center (internal quotation marks omitted))).
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Common Law courts indict these embodiments of our nomos for
11 7
treason.
The entire Ohio Supreme Court has been indicted by a
Common Law court, 118 as have many federal judges across the nation.1 9 Indictments are a form of conditional threat - if the defendant is convicted, punishment will follow - but they are more
than that. They are an assertion of authority, the authority to condemn. Whether the Common Law courts mean to insist on the au12 0
thority to condemn with violence and not just words is unclear.
As one of our state court judges observed, "[W]hen you hear about
things like indictments .... [y]ou wonder what they will do to
enforce these things. All judges who have heard of this have some
concerns."121
As the acting chief justice of the Ohio Common Law court, Bill
Ellwood, explained it, he would first issue subpoenas for persons
named in the indictments to appear before him and ask the county
sheriff to enforce those subpoenas. If the sheriff were to refuse, he
would ask the local U.S. Marshals Service. If that failed, the
National Guard would be asked.122 "If the National Guard fails,
then people have no place to go but to the constitutional militia
.... Yes, the militia are involved. They are the last resort of en23
forcement for the common law courts.'
The state, claiming as it does a near-perfect monopoly on force,
would not let an armed group exercise force in the name of a competing law. The militia would be destroyed; our law would kill it.
Not surprisingly then, the Common Law community has refrained
from using its militias to enforce the edicts. Instead, the edicts
stand as implicit invitations for individuals in the community to take
action. Some take up the invitation: After being indicted by a
Common Law court for unlawfully asserting jurisdiction over a
Sovereign Citizen charged with a traffic violation, Hamilton,
Montana, municipal judge Martha Bethel of Montana received
threats saying she would be brought to the Common Law court by
force to stand trial. That was only the beginning:
117. See id.
118. See And-Government Groups Hearings, supra note 15, at 138 (statement of Ted
Almay, Superintendent, Ohio Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation).
119. See Brown, supra note 12.
120. Some Common Law courts have declined to issue indictments, apparently because
the actions that these indictments may require imply too great a commitment to violence.
See Potok, supra note 11, at IA.
121. Brown, supranote 12; see also Braun, supra note 11 (reporting that after judge and
jury were sent treason indictments, marshals began guarding them as they heard evidence in
tax case against "Common Law advocates").
122. See Brown, supra note 12.
123. Id.(quoting Ellwood, author of Ohio Handbook, supra note 15 (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
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After someone threatened to "riddle my home with gunfire," the
police came to map my house and land. They told me which room to
hide in if the house were attacked. They suggested I pack a duffel bag
and a police radio, flashlight and other emergency gear. They
mapped out where in the woods I would hide with the children if we
had to run.
Over Easter weekend, the police suggested we leave the county

after they received information that an attack would be made on me
or my house. Most recently, a Federal law enforcement agency told

* me a contract had been issued for my murder. 124
Other judges have received similar threats1 25and also have sought
protection from law enforcement agencies.
That individuals have taken up the words of Common Law
courts as a warrant for action is not surprising. Speaking of the
connection between the words of our courts and the violent acts of
our law, Professor Cover wrote:
Persons who act within social organizations that exercise authority act
violently without experiencing the normal inhibitions or the normal
degree of inhibition which regulates the behavior of those who act
autonomously. When judges interpret, they trigger agentic behavior

within just such an institution or social organization. On one level
judges may appear to be, and may in fact be, offering their understanding of the normative world to their intended audience. But on
another level they are engaging a violent mechanism through which a

substantial part of their audience loses its capacity to think and act
autonomously.'2
In our legal order, when the judge denies a stay, the executioner
does not deliberate further: he pulls the switch. In the Common
Law world, the transformation of judicial utterances into violence is
much more open-ended. After a Common Law judge speaks, who
shall do what, and when, are questions without definitive answers.
Nonetheless, it is clear from what their judges have said that their
words are intended to trigger action.1 27
124. Martha A. Bethel, Editorial, Terror in Montana,N.Y. TuApss, July 20, 1995, at A23.
125. See Anti-Government Groups Hearings, supra note 15, at 138 (statement of Ted
Almay, Superintendent, Ohio Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation) (reporting on threats against Ohio judges and on one Ohio judge who has requested and received
police protection for himself and his family); Katherine M. Skiba, Extremists Take Up the
Gavel, MILWAUEE J. SENmE, Oct. 29, 1995, at 1 (reporting on threats against Montana
judges).
126. Cover, supra note 92, at 1615.
127. The acting chief justice of the Ohio Common Law court attenuates somewhat the
connection between his words and violence by inserting procedural steps that will postpone
the moment when the militia is called to act. See supra text accompanying notes 122-23.
However, Leonard Ginter, one of 23 members of the Common Law national supreme court,
manages to invite more immediate action by invoking the past and yet speaking in the present tense.
Go back to the time when somebody committed treason years ago, most of them were
put on a scaffold to swing.... That's what we need to do. If we do about 10 of them,
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Courts thus are more than concrete embodiments of an extant
nomos. That is, courts also develop and implement a "system of
cues and signals"'128 that triggers violent acts, helping to organize
the violence within a community and to direct it toward a common
goal: the death of alternative normative understandings. Courts
express a community's commitment to kill off other legal understandings within the community and outside the community if the
court's jurisdiction purports to extend beyond community limits, as
the Common Law's does. The law that the Common Law courts
are dedicated to terminating is, of course, ours. Their indictment of
our judges and law enforcement officials makes that mission clear.
This community is not, however, unaware of the formidable array of violence at our legal order's disposal. The knowledge that we
have killed their martyrs instructs them to proceed cautiously in
elaborating the commitment that Common Law adherents are expected to demonstrate. And signs of caution can be found. 129 But
a legal vision powerful enough to have created a world in which
people live and a destiny to which they aspire is a force not easily
contained.
Faced with the awesome power of our law, most communities
change their law, altering its destiny and its meaning, so that the
community that aspires to its own law is not destroyed by the
greater force opposing it. The militia community does not seem
poised to make that move of accommodation. 130 But the historical
review Catherine Stock provides in Rural Radicals demonstrates
how other radical movements, similar in many respects to this one,
managed to alter their destinies. Moreover, she illuminates the
paths that some in this community might use to do just that - the
latent, but potentially resonant, narratives that might change the
the rest will straighten out. It wouldn't necessarily have to be a judge or a governor. If
one governor got it, we wouldn't have any trouble with the rest.
Id. (quoting Leonard Ginter); see also Gallagher et al., supra note 18 (describing Common
Law court's trial, conviction, and issuance of arrest warrant for Franklin County, Missouri,
Associate Judge Michael Brown on charge of treason); Anti-Government Groups Hearings,
supra note 15, at 153 (statement of Nickolas C. Murnion, attorney, Garfield County, Jordan,
Montana) (relating how Common Law constable envisioned process against State officials:
"[W]e would be tried by a jury composed of freemen and if convicted the penalty would be
death by hanging," and to save taxpayer money the hanging would be from a bridge instead
of a gallows). Gintner served five years in prisoner for conspiracy and harboring a prisoner
for his role in helping Gordon Kahl elude authorities. See Bill Simmons, Ark. Man Awaits
Takeover of Courts, Com. ApPEAL (Memphis), May 7, 1995, at B2 (describing Ginter's role

on Common Law supreme court and in Kahl case).
128. Cover, supra note 92, at 1628.

129. For example, one commentator reports that most "rightist leaders won't publicly
back the indictments" against our judges and officials because it is "too early to take that
step." Potok, supra note 11, at IA.
130. See eg., Sam Howe Verhovek, Serious Face on a Texas Independence Group, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 24, 1997, at Al (describing formation of "Republic of Texas" by Common Law
advocates).
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shape of this nomos and redefine the aims of this law. In the end,
however, she is agnostic on whether this community will transform
itself and adopt more constructive goals, reminding us that bloody
confrontations are also an important part of our past and perhaps
of our future.
Dees and Corcoran do not see this community moving to a
more accommodating legal vision. They see the community moving
toward war, a bloody and ultimately futile confrontation with the
state. They sound the alert and ask us to reinforce our legal barricades, to change the way we understand and use our law so that we
might more efficiently dispose of the threat this community poses.
All law necessarily changes in the face of committed resistance, and
our law is no exception. Our law has already responded to the
threat posed by the Common Law. Dees and Corcoran want more.
How our law responds dictates what our law will be, what shape our
world will take. Thus far our law's response to the Common Law
has gone unnoticed by legal academics; it is time we paid attention.
When worlds collide the trajectories of both are changed.
How Tim COMMON LAW Is CHANGING OURS
There was a man with a tongue of wood
Who essayed to sing
And in truth it was lamentable
But there was one who heard
The clip-clapper of this tongue of wood
And knew what the man
Wished to sing
And with that the singer was content. 131
Our judges hear the clip-clap of the Common Law and pronounce it "frivolous."' 132 In our world, classifying a legal argument
as "frivolous" is an action of significance. In our courts, one is free
to urge "the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or
the establishment33 of new law," only if one's position is designated
"nonfrivolous.'
Thus, frivolousness is a legal boundary. Official
state law describes three areas of normative space: the world of law
in which we live ("existing law"), the world of law in which we
might live ("nonfrivolous" new law), and the world of law we must
131. STEP-EN CRANE, WAR Is KIND, reprintedin STEP EN CRAM: PRosE AND POETRY

1325, 1332 (J.C. Levenson ed., 1984).
132. See eg., United States v. Schmitt, 784 F.2d 880,882 (8th Cir. 1986) (describing claim
that our courts lack jurisdiction over "Freemen" as "entirely frivolous"); Ryan v. Bilby, 764
F.2d 1325, 1328-29 (9th Cir. 1985) (sanctioning Common Law arguments as "frivolous appeals," however "heartfelt"); Peth v. Breitzmann, 611 F. Supp. 50, 56-57 (E.D. Wis. 1985)
(sanctioning Common Law adherents for filing "frivolous" lawsuits against agents of federal
government).
133. FEr. R. Cmv. PRoc. 11(b)(2).
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not inhabit ("frivolous" law). State force stands ready to enforce
"existing law" to maintain the world we know. More interesting,
state force supports the continual creation of worlds that might be.
In other words, our law allows people to invoke compulsory process
to insist that others answer "nonfrivolous" arguments about what
the law should be. But one who employs state force - that is, inyokes court process - to argue for frivolous law, or law that must
not be, risks punishment by the state. These boundary lines are
hotly contested, 34 as they should be, given that what is at stake is
nothing less than the definition of the inhabitable world. What is,
however, sometimes lost in this debate is the importance to any
nomos of marking the edge of the inhabitable world in some way.
"Maintaining the world is no small matter and requires no less
energy than creating it.' 135 In our world, this task requires enormous ingenuity as well as great energy because our concept of liberty, most specifically the First Amendment, insists that the state
abjure control over most of the material used to construct new legal
worlds. "[T]he narratives that create and reveal the patterns of
commitment, resistance, and understanding - patterns that constitute the dynamic between precept and material universe - are radically uncontrolled" 136 in our legal order. That "is the radical
message of the first amendment."' 3 7 Our legal order proclaims our
freedom to create through narrative any vision of law we choose.
Moreover, while our law proclaims that the state has primary responsibility for articulating what precepts count as law, it reserves
space for private groups to articulate precepts that are treated as
law.' 38 Our legal order allows nonstate actors not just to imagine
law through talk, but to express commitment to the law they create
through action, even when their acts conflict with official law as
recognized by the state. No matter how well established a particular legal interpretation is, if a court redefines state law to incorporate the legal interpretation 39demonstrated by the action, no
punishment may be imposed.
Maintaining the contours of a legal order dedicated to the
proliferation of legal meaning, and in which pronouncements of the
134. See GEoFFREY C. HAzARD, JR.ET A., T~m LAW AND Enmcs oF LAWYEINO 430-

31 & n.61 (2d ed. 1994) (citing sources discussing issue).
135. Cover, supra note 9, at 16.
136. Id at 17.
137. Md

138. The general tort principle that accepts a profession's standards as providing the standard of care in negligence cases is one instance of this. See HAZARD ET AT-, supra note 134,
at 187-88.
139. This general rule is subject to an important caveat to which we will return. An injunction may not generally be challenged by committed action. Even if a court later accepts
the challenger's understanding that the injunction was illegally issued, the now "lawful" conduct may nonetheless be punished. See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967).

May 1997]

Militias

1793

state are almost always subject to serious challenge, is no simple
matter. Maintaining our nomos requires some very deft maneuvering, and I now want to ask whether, in responding to the Common
Law, our legal order is becoming klutzy in the way it maintains our
world.
Injunctions are designed to kill competing legal understandings.
With an injunction, a court insists that action in the future will conform to the judge's understanding of law. Those enjoined may continue to believe what they like, but acting on those beliefs will
trigger state force. Because injunctions are powerful weapons
designed to kill competing law, a nomos dedicated to proliferating
legal meaning will disfavor their use. And so ours does, at least in
theory. When challenged by the powerful competing constitutional
vision put forth by the American labor movement at the beginning
of this century, however, this supposedly disfavored tool of law became a judicial favorite.140 Moreover, while it might comfort those
of us committed to a nomos with lots of open normative space to
think that the injunction law articulated then did not permanently
alter the shape of our world, it did. Howat v. Kansas,141 which exalted the labor injunction, buttresses Walker v. City of
Birningham.142 Walker, which insists that even an unconstitutional
injunction must be obeyed, blocks an important route from existing
law to law we might achieve and wish to affirm. The heavy-handed
use of the labor injunction, leading as it did to Walker, thus had
lasting effects.
To combat the Common Law, courts are once again employing
injunctions, as if they posed no special threat to the legal order they
supposedly protect. Courts routinely approve permanent and
sweeping injunctions forbidding Common Law adherents from M1ing liens against government officials and others. For example, in
permanently enjoining two named persons and "all those in active
concert or participation with them" from filing Common Law liens
and garnishments aimed at any federal employee, one federal district court judge said this:
I find that the public interest will be served by an injunction forbidding this harassment in the future, and such an injunction shall issue.
In framing such an injunction, I rely upon the power granted to me by
26 U.S.C. § 7402, which authorizes me to make such orders as are
necessary for the enforcement of the internal revenue laws. [Notice
that the injunction framed applied to all federal employees, not just
those enforcing tax laws.] I am also mindful of the fact that legitimate
political expression must not be foreclosed; only harassment of fed140. See Forbath, supra note 9, at 1148-79 (describing the use of the labor injunction as a
means of killing off a competing understanding of law); Pope, supranote 9, at 967-68 (same).
141. 258 U.S. 181 (1922).
142. 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
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eral employees in their personal lives. In framing such an injunction I
also act under the "rule of necessity," see Van Dyke v. Moore [a previous case involving some of the same actors now before the court],
since Van Dyke [one of those enjoined] has purportedto sue the federal judges in this district, as well as all Ninth Circuit judges in
Oregon, in an attempt to prevent federal judges from hearing such
cases. 143

The "rule of necessity"? A tax injunction that protects all federal employees? The public interest? Not since cases like In re
Debs,144 one of the more notorious labor injunction cases, 145 have
courts described their injunctive powers so broadly.146 Moreover,
the Common Law cases are broader than the labor cases in one
respect - the description of the threat to public order that justifies
the lien injunctions is so trivial. The described threat is that federal
agents might be less than vigilant in enforcing the law if they are
not protected from frivolous legal claims. Next to such a threat, the
Pullman strike looks like a real threat to the nation's continued
existence. Moreover, the trivial threat described in the lien cases
not only supports the injunctions, but confers standing on the government to petition the courts in the name of restoring public
order. 147

143. United States v. Van Dyke, 568 F. Supp. 820, 822 (D. Or. 1983) (emphasis added)
(citation omitted); see also United States v. Andra, 923 F. Supp. 157, 159-60 (D. Idaho 1996)
(limiting permanent injunction to liens filed against agents of the IRS but justifying the injunction by stating only that the liens are "null, void and of no legal effect," and thus should
be enjoined); United States v. St. Paul, No. CV-93-1790 LGB (Ex), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13454 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 30 1993) (issuing injunction to prohibit the filing of liens against any
federal employee based on I.R.C. § 7402 (1994); 28 U.S.C. § 1340 (1994), which confers jurisdiction on district courts in matters arising under the tax laws, and 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1994),
which confers jurisdiction on district courts in civil actions commenced by the United States).
144. 158 U.s. 564 (1895).
145. See OwRN M. Fiss, -IsTORY OF TH SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888-1910, at 58-72 (1993).

146. In Debs, Justice Brewer, writing for the Court, affirmed the injunction that broke the
Pullman railroad workers' strike, explaining that a court's power to issue such an injunction
rested on "obligations which [government] is under to promote the interest of all, and to
prevent the wrongdoing of one resulting in injury to the general welfare." 158 U.S. at 584.
Moreover, that open-ended "obligation" of government could, according to the Court, itself
confer standing on the government to petition the court to restore public order. 158 U.S. at
584.
147. See United States v. Hart, 545 F. Supp. 470, 474 (D.N.D. 1982) ("Hart argues that
the United States lacks standing .... Under the facts of this case, the suggestion is frivolous." (citing In re Debs)), affd. per curiam, 701 F.2d 749 (8th Cir. 1983). The court rested its
power to issue the injunction on the trilogy of statutes cited later in St. Paul, 1993 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13454, at *3, see supra note 143 (describing those statutes), and another, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1357 (1994), conferring jurisdiction on district courts in actions by any person alleging injury while acting pursuant to an act of Congress to collect revenues or to enforce the right to
vote. These sources, according to the district court, justified permanently enjoining Hart and
those acting in concert with him from attempting, inter alia, "to... interrupt... any federal,
state, county, or municipal official in the performance of their official duties." Hart, 545 F.
Supp. at 475. In affirming this decision, the appellate court ignored the district court's broad
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Courts have not only loosened the constraints on when injunctions might be issued and vastly expanded the government's power
to seek them, they have also issued some staggeringly broad injunctions to protect our nomos, which these cases reshape into one that
tolerates very little disorder. For example, in United States v. Hart,
the district court permanently enjoined "Hart and all others in active concert or participation with him from making arrests of or
otherwise attempting to molest, interrupt,hinder or impede any federal, state, county, or municipal official in the performance of their
official duties.'48 The Eighth Circuit upheld this injunction with no
discussion of its breadth. 149 In United States v. Kaun, 50 the district
court enjoined Kaun, from, inter alia:
Organizing... an entity or otherwise promoting any plan...
based upon (a) the false representation that wages ... are exempt
from federal income taxation, or (b) any other such frivolous claim
with respect to the scope of federal income taxation ....
Advertising, marketing, or selling any documents [ that made such
claims about income taxation] ...
Filing, providing forms for, or otherwise aiding and abetting the
filing of Freedom of Information requests with the Internal Revenue
Service.
[Or fliling... or prosecut[ing] ... any civil action in any court in
the United States ... based on [such claims].' 5'
The scope of this injunction is astonishing. To justify this awesome
exercise of power, the district court noted that the legal understanding advocated and acted upon by Kaun was shared not just by members of his immediate circle but by other groups across the nation
and emphasized that this legal understanding was being transmitted
in group classes devoted to constitutional law and other legal
subjects. 52
The Seventh Circuit upheld this injunction, although the court
first "narrowly" interpreted some of its parts. 153 The "narrowing"
process did not, however, dramatically curtail the injunction's
scope. For example, the court made it clear that Kaun could attend
meetings with other tax protesters and could "share his general beliefs" with others. 54 The injunction, however, would be violated "if
interpretation of the government's standing and in a conclusory sentence affirmed the power
of the district court to enjoin Hart. Hart,701 F.2d at 750.
148. 545 F. Supp. at 475 (emphasis added).
149. See 701 F2d at 750.
150. 633 F. Supp. 406, 418 (E.D. Wis. 1986), affd., 827 F.2d 1144 (7th Cir. 1987).
151. 633 F. Supp. at 418.
152. See 633 F. Supp. at 411-12 (discussing how Kaun group is associated with other
groups and noting that members of Kaun's group were required to attend sessions on constitutional law and other legal subjects).
153. United States v. Kaun, 827 F.2d 1144 (7th Cir. 1987).
154. 827 F.2d at 1152.
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... Kaun actually persuaded others, directly or indirectly, to violate
the tax laws, or if... Kaun's words and actions were directed toward
such persuasion in a situation
where the unlawful conduct was
imminently
likely to occur." 155 After offering its "narrow" interpretation of the injunction, the Seventh
Circuit held that the injunction
156
was neither vague nor overbroad.
Broad and weakly justified injunctions are not the only change
in our normative landscape that the Common Law movement, or
more precisely our judges' reaction to the Common Law movement, has effectuated. The intolerance for competing law, demonstrated by the expansion of injunctive power, manifests itself in
other ways. Most notably, in United States v. Schneider,'57 the
Seventh Circuit stated that demonstrating disrespect for our law
warrants extra punishment. Schneider was convicted in federal district court of threatening the life of a state court judge. He had
written a letter to the Illinois Supreme Court that contained the
following language:
I remind you again, that this "Idiota Persona Non Grata" [the circuit
court judge] is of your problem and if is allowed to continue to be
mine, he will be executed as the pending [here the Seventh Circuit
inserted "warning?" in brackets] to others as enemies of the Constitution and Nation by his act of War .... You had better nuffify [sic] and
countermand any of this demented orders or he will be nullified for
his criminal activities.158
The Seventh Circuit found that the threat was:
ambiguous, but the task of interpretation was for the jury, which did
not take leave of its senses in concluding that it really was a threat to
kill the circuit judge if his superiors did not rein him in and nullify his
orders; that it was not just the rhetoric of hyperbole that comes so
easily to the lips of angry Americans.159
The Court emphasized that the judge asked for protection from the
local sheriff.
The fact that the victim acts as if he believed the threat... is evidence
that it could reasonably be believed and therefore that it is a
threat.... We add that the high level of violence in this country, some
of it directed against public
officials, warrants juries in taking such
threats deadly seriously.' 60
Here the Seventh Circuit makes clear its view: our understanding of what constitutes a threat by this defendant must change in
response to our perception that our legal order is more generally
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

827
See
910
910
910
910

F.2d at 1151-52.
827 F.2d at 1153.
F.2d 1569, 1571 (7th Cir. 1990).
F.2d at 1570 (internal quotation marks omitted) (first alteration in original).
F.2d at 1570 (citations omitted).
F.2d at 1571.
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under attack. Not content with bolstering the protection afforded
the legal order against injury by stretching what constitutes a criminal threat, the court then approved the idea of punishing insult to
the legal order, helping yet again to reshape our nomos into one
intolerant of dissent. The district court had imposed the maximum
sentence on Schneider, five years. In approving the stiff sentence,
the Seventh Circuit sent a message to those who would construct
new law: "Persons who do not merely violate the law, but flout it,
can expect to be punished more severely than161
persons who do not
thus season their criminality with effrontery."
CONCLUSION

We, scholars of the law, hear neither the clip-clap emanating
from the Common Law community nor the clip-clap our courts are
generating in response. One dark, complex, and dangerous world
of law is generating another, moving our nomos perceptibly closer
to the Common Law's characterization of our world. And where
are we? We are otherwise occupied - busy exercising our own
tongues of wood, content to be understood by one another, and
relatively comfortable, if not proud,162that lawyers and judges find
little of value in most of our songs.
Consider Kierkegaard's tale:
When Philip threatened to lay siege to the city of Corinth, and all
its inhabitants hastily bestirred themselves in defense, some polishing
weapons, some gathering stones, some repairing the walls, Diogenes
seeing all this hurriedly folded his mantle about him and began to roll
his tub zealously back and forth through the streets. When he was
asked why he did this he replied that he wished to be busy like all the
rest, and rolled his tub
lest he should be the only idler among so many
163
industrious citizens.
There are actually more important things for us to do. Pay attention to the clip-clap of law outside of our confined community. Investigate some law on the ground. Pick up one of these books or
another on this movement and contemplate the many ways in which
161. 910 F.2d at 1571.

162. There may be a different audience out there, an audience thirsty for law. It requires
no great leap of imagination to contemplate members of the Common Law community, those
Internet groupies, reading our words. They might enjoy Professor Ackerman's insistence
that legal understandings commonly used in our world to establish the legitimacy of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the New Deal are "built on sand." BRucE ACKERMAN, WE THE
PEOPLE: FOUNDATONS 44 (1991). They would get a particular kick out of his insistence that
the Fourteenth Amendment was not ratified in accordance with Article V of the Constitution, see Bruce Ackerman, ConstitutionalPolitics/ConstitutionalLaw, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 50007 (1989), as they insist themselves.
163. PARABLEs OF KiERKEGAAPD 5 (Thomas C. Oden ed., Princeton Univ. Press 1978)
(quoting Johannes Climacus, PhilosophicalFragments).
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law distorts, destroys, and regenerates itself. Are you busy rolling
your tub? Clip-Clap. Law is growing out there.

